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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to show that conventions are sources of tacit 
agreements. Such agreements are tacit in the sense that they are implicated by 
what the agents do (or forbear to do) though without that any communication 
between them be necessary. Conventions are sources of tacit agreements under 
two substantial assumptions: (1) that there is a salient interpretation, in some 
contexts, of every-one’s silence as confirmatory of the others’ expectations, and 
(2) that the agents share a value of not hostility. To characterize the normativity 
of agreements the Principle of Reliability is introduced. 
1   Introduction 
Conventions are social means for the sake of common ends. A common end needs not 
be a desire we pursue together (i.e. our joint desire to meet each other). A set of de-
sires that are jointly co-realizable may suffice (i.e. our self-regarding desires to avoid 
collisions in traffic): coincidence of interests is, at least, agreement in desires1. Con-
ventions describe a way to behave in recurrent situations, which is sufficient to obtain 
something we all want but which is at risk because of our reciprocal interference. 
Conventions are not necessary means though. They are arbitrary since some other 
way to behave might serve the same purpose. That is, our common interest (our ends 
in agreement) is to be fulfilled if our desires for the means are also in agreement, 
when at least another possible arrangement is foreseeable. To be useful, conventions 
should be stable: when established, conventions perpetuate themselves. And they are 
so because it is in the best interest of all of us to keep acting as we do, if the others do 
the same. Moreover this fact, as all the rest, is common knowledge between us, so 
much that, if one bothered enough to reason from the perspective of another fellow, it 
would discover that conformity to the convention is in the best interest of all the oth-
ers and so be assured that the regularity will keep on.  
                                                           
11 Two agents “agree in desires if exactly the same world would satisfy the desires of both; and 
a world that satisfies someone’s desires is one wherein he has all the properties that he de-
sires de se and wherein all the propositions hold the he desires de dicto. Agreement in desire 
makes for harmony” [20]. On the distinction between attitudes de dicto and attitudes de se 
see [18]. 
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The idea that conventions are a peculiar kind of regularity in behaviour along these 
lines has been forcefully defended by David Lewis [15] [17], whose theory is consid-
ered by him as analogous to the one sketched by Hume in the Treatise while discuss-
ing the origin of justice and property. 
According to this view, conventions describe a self-enforcing behavioural pattern; 
do they prescribe it too?  
Many critics of Lewis’ theory of conventions have been sceptical about his analy-
sis, precisely because it seems that Lewis has missed the normative component. One 
way to put the critique being that conventions are not mere regularities but rules, not 
only regularities de facto but also regularities de jure [24] [8] [21]. Telling the truth 
when one is speaking in English is not only something that we usually do, it is some-
thing we ought to do. And the same is true for all the conventions we are parties of. 
Conformity to our conventions is not just what we happen to do, is something that is 
“required” from us.  
Though often not acknowledged, Lewis’ theory is able to readily accommodate 
these critiques. It is explicitly stated, in fact, that: “any convention is, by definition, a 
norm which there is some presumption that one ought to conform to (…) it is also by 
definition a socially enforced norm: one is expected to conform, and failure to con-
form tends to evoke unfavourable responses from others” [15].  
What kind of norm any convention is, however, is not immediately clear.  
Lewis suggests that there may be all sorts of reasons why, for any particular con-
vention, one ought to conform to that particular regularity. If the convention origi-
nated by an exchange of promises, then one ought to act also to keep the promise; if 
the convention is also a social contract, then one ought to reciprocate the obtained 
benefit. Notwithstanding so, there are also general reasons why one ought to conform 
which are valid for any regularity that qualifies as a convention, for any population 
relative to which the convention exists, and for any situation the convention applies 
to.  
Such general reasons derive from the fact that by conforming to a convention one 
acts in one’s own best interest, and, at the same time, in a way that answers to others’ 
preferences, when they reasonably expect one to do so. Both acting in one’s own best 
interest and in the way that is in the interest of others (when they reasonably expect 
one to do so) are something that, according to Lewis, “we do presume, other things 
being equal, that one ought to do”. If the former is a requirement of instrumental ra-
tionality, the latter stems from a moral principle that is, somehow, acknowledged by 
us. But is it so? 
Alice has a good reason to expect Bob to do an action because John told her so. 
She completely trusts John; hence Alice has a reason to believe what John says. She 
really wants Bob to behave in that way and she reasonably expect him to behave so. 
Is this sufficient for Bob to be required to do the action in question? If Bob is not in 
any way responsible for what Alice believes, why ought he do that action?  
Similarly, one can be reasonable in expecting conformity to a certain convention 
given widespread conformity in the population (e.g. it is reasonable to expect the next 
driver to keep the right given one’s experience with what this population of drivers 
usually do) even without any direct experience with those of the others one is now 
dealing with (e.g. one’s expectation about what the next driver will do is not grounded 
in one’s experience with that driver). How is it, then, that such anonymous agent is 
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responsible for expectations he has not induced? Though our intuition tells us that any 
anonymous driver ought to conform to the convention that prevails in that population, 
it is not evident why he is so bound since he bears no immediate responsibility for 
what anyone reasonably expects from him.   
In order to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes any convention, in this 
paper we will argue that conventions are sources of agreements, though it is not nec-
essarily by agreement that a convention is established. That a convention is an agree-
ment is usually considered as a platitude, so much that once the notion of convention 
is understood, it is thereby clarified in which sense a behavioural regularity is also an 
agreement. Agreements however are not only agreements in desire that as a conse-
quence produce regularities in behaviour. Agreements are specific kinds of social re-
lationships between the agents, and are created with the aim to produce such agree-
ments in desires (see Sections 4 and 6). Agreements are considered by Lewis as a 
means to produce a system of mutual expectations [15], but what is important for us, 
is that the converse also holds: a system of mutual expectations of the kind presup-
posed by a convention is a source of agreements. This suggestion, however, seems to 
be counter-intuitive given that conventions are typically maintained without the need 
of any communication between the parties. If this is true, how can agreements be es-
tablished without communication? How can conventions be real agreements and not a 
way to behave as if we have agreed though we didn’t?  
It has been Hume’s suggestion that a convention is an “agreement betwixt us, 
though without the interposition of a promise”. The aim of this article is to clarify 
what kind of agreement is established, once a convention is in place. By doing this, 
the peculiar normativity of conventions will be also analysed. The normativity of 
conventions is the same normativity of agreements, because conventions become 
agreements, tacit agreements but agreements nonetheless. 
2   From preferences to reasons to conform  
Let’s first rehearse what a convention is.  
Few years after his first contribution on the topic [15], Lewis amended his original 
analysis, by offering the following definition [17]: 
 
 A regularity R, in action or in action and belief, is a convention in a popula-
tion P if and only if, within P, the following six conditions hold:  
1. Everyone conforms to R. 
2. Everyone believes that the others conform to R. 
3. This belief that the others conform to R gives everyone a good and decisive reason 
to conform to R himself.  
4. Everyone who believes that at least almost everyone conforms to R will want the 
others, as well as himself, to conform. 
5. R is not the only possible regularity meeting the last two conditions. There is at 
least one alternative R’ such that the belief the others conformed to R’ would give 
everyone a good and decisive reason to conform to R’ likewise. 
3
6. Finally, the various facts listed in conditions (1) to (5) are matters of common (or 
mutual) knowledge.   
 
This definition is meant to capture the core of our common concept of convention 
whereby we are ready to acknowledge that a practiced regularity in acting or in acting 
and believing (condition 1), that everybody expects widespread conformity to (condi-
tion 2), that is arbitrary (condition 5) but serving our common ends (condition 4), and 
that perpetuate itself and it is stable because it is openly known that past conformity 
gives everyone a reason to go on conforming (condition 3 and 6), is what we would 
indeed consider one of our conventions2.  
Lewis has amended his 1969 analysis in several ways, but one change was particu-
larly relevant to his original target, that is, the explanation of what convention under-
lies the use of a certain language by a population. Since clause (3) was originally for-
mulated in terms of a conditional preference for conformity, the only acceptable 
regularities were in action alone: it makes no sense to prefer to believe something, 
since you cannot choose what to believe. As a consequence the convention governing 
the use of a language was characterized as a convention of truthfulness in that lan-
guage, whereby only speakers conform to the convention, and, by doing so, coordi-
nate with past speakers who truthfully used that language in the past [15]. Differently, 
the amended definition makes room for a regularity in action and belief to count as a 
convention since others’ conformity provides one with a reason either to do or to be-
lieve something. The formulation in terms of reasons for conformity (instead of pref-
erences for conformity) opens the way for coordination between speakers and hearers 
so that the convention whereby a population uses a language becomes a convention of 
truthfulness and trust, that is, a regularity in which conformity for speakers means to 
do something (i.e. speak truthfully) and for hearers to believe what speakers say since 
both share an interest in communicating and each other conformity is a practical or an 
epistemic reason to conform.  
3   Generalizing Lewis: trust by convention 
Once, however, convention is defined in this way it is also clear that trust, properly 
defined, is not peculiar of conventions of language alone.   
Trust, in fact, is both a state of mind and a behaviour [3] in which an agent expects 
and wants that another agent does something, relies on this agent to behave in this 
way, and does in fact delegate the fulfilment of one’s own desire to another agent. By 
trusting another agent, one makes oneself vulnerable; one exposes oneself to the risk 
that the other will not behave in the expected way and so frustrating one’s desires.  
Crucial for trusting is reliance on an agent for something, and not just reliance on 
something happening [13]. When we rely on something happening, say that the train 
will arrive on time, we assume that it will happen (usually because we believe that it 
                                                           
2 Many of course have challenged this analysis under several different aspects. Here we will 
just assume it as correct, and focus on how, within such a framework, the normativity of 
conventions can be accounted for. For a critical assessment of Lewis’ theory see [8]. For a 
recent account see [10].  
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will happen) and plan or intend accordingly.  Differently, when we trust an agent we 
rely on him as an agent, that is, as an autonomous entity driven by his own beliefs and 
desires that are his reasons either to believe or do something. That is, when we rely on 
an agent to behave in some way, we assume that such agent will behave in that way 
and we plan or intend on this basis because the agent’s behaviour is based on his rea-
sons, not just because he his coerced to behave in that way. If I coerce you into giving 
me your pocket, I rely on the fact that you will give me your pocket but I do not rely 
on you to give it to me; there’s no question of trust in coercive interactions. By the 
same token, trust also presupposes that the trustee is not motivated by a hostile atti-
tude towards the trustor, so much that the trustor at least believes or assume such non-
hostility in those the trustor rely on [3]. Trust is a fundamental non-hostile attitude3. 
Trust is relative to a desire one is pursuing and whose fulfilment depends on an-
other agent’s behaviour4. Desires can be either epistemic desires (i.e. the desire to 
know something or to know whether something is true or not) or practical ones (i.e. 
the desire that the world be in some way). Correspondently, reliance on somebody to 
behave in some way can be either for an epistemic or practical desire. That is, if I 
epistemically rely on you, I rely on you to do something in order to fulfil an epistemic 
desire of mine, something that typically happens by way of communication5. In such a 
case, epistemic reliance entails that I assume that you will truthfully communicate 
with me because you are motivated (for some reason) to so act, and, on this basis, be-
lieving what you want me to believe. This is the kind of trust that Lewis had in mind, 
where trust is coming to believe something. On the other hand, when I practically rely 
on you, I rely on you to do something in order to realize a state of affairs that I desire. 
If I rely on you to drive on the right side of the road, such practical reliance entails 
that I assume that you will so drive since you have a reason to do such an action, and I 
will behave accordingly. In both situations, by coming to believe something or by act-
ing on the basis of my expectation about you, I trust you. 
Finally, one trusts on the basis of reasons. But what are the reasons to trust an-
other? Sometimes trusting may be ‘irrational’, as when, by making oneself vulner-
able, one thereby creates a selfish reason for another to exploit such vulnerability6. 
Other times, trust is perfectly reasonable as when one relies on another to do some-
thing simply because it is also in the interest of the other agent to act in that way. 
Even if in this case trust is reasonable and more secure, it is not of course without 
risks given that the other could simply change his mind and act differently.  
What is then the relation between trust and conventions? 
According to the definition of convention given above, in any convention, the 
agents do conform to some regularity, want the others to conform, expect future con-
formity of their fellows, and this belief is a reason to conform (i.e. a practical reason 
to do an action or an epistemic reason to believe something). Given this, it is clear 
that any act of conformity to a convention is also an act of reliance on the others to 
                                                           
3 See Section 6 for the relevance of not being motivated by hostile attitudes. 
4 That is, the trusting agent believes to be dependent on another one to obtain something he de-
sires [3],[4]. 
5 Though this is not necessary, see Section 8. 
6 If one extends a loan to another assuming that the other will do his best to repay it, one also 
gives the other a selfish reason not to repay it; see [1]. 
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conform: the reason to conform is also the reason to trust, to rely upon the others and 
doing something accordingly. Since, however, by conforming one trusts in others’ 
conformity, that is, in their trust in oneself, the regularities that count as conventions 
are regularities of reciprocal trust. Moreover, since the expectation of conformity is a 
reason to conform, trust is based on trust: I have a reason to trust you if you trust me 
and you have a reason to trust me if I trust you.  
 
More precisely: a regularity R in reciprocal trust in a population P is a convention 
if and only if the following six conditions hold: 
1. Everyone conforms to R, that is, everyone reciprocally trusts each other.   
2. Everyone believes that others conform to R, that is, everyone believes that the oth-
ers trust in oneself. 
3. This belief that everyone conforms to R (i.e. rely on each other) gives everyone a 
good and decisive reason to conform to R himself (i.e. to rely on the others). That 
is, the belief that everyone reciprocally relies upon each other is a reason for eve-
ryone to rely on the others. This reason can be for practical reliance, if conforming 
to R is a matter of reliance on the others to act in a certain way and acting oneself 
accordingly. This reason can be for epistemic reliance, if conforming to R is a mat-
ter of reliance on the others to act in a certain way and believing oneself accord-
ingly. In the case of a regularity of practical reliance, some desired end may be 
reached by relying upon the others and acting accordingly, provided that the others 
also rely upon on each other; therefore he wants to rely on the others and act, if 
they so rely and act. In the case of a regularity of epistemic reliance, his beliefs to-
gether with the belief that the others practically rely upon himself are premises that 
deductively imply or inductively support a conclusion, and by believing this con-
clusion he would thereby conform to R (i.e. he would epistemically rely on the 
others).  
4. Everyone who believes that the others conform to R (reciprocally trust each other) 
will want the others, as well as himself, to conform (i.e. to trust on oneself).  
5. R is not the only regularity meeting the last two conditions. There is at least one al-
ternative regularity R’ in reciprocal reliance which would perpetuate itself instead 
of R.  
6. The various facts listed above in conditions (1) to (5) are matters of common 
knowledge.  
 
Any convention then is always a form of reciprocal trust, which is sustained by 
past reciprocal trust, and that breeds future trust. Such reciprocal trust is reasonable 
since by trusting we are able to agree in the choice of the means to fulfil each of our 
individual end. Reciprocal trust can originate in several different ways, for example 
by explicit agreement. However, a regularity of reciprocal trust qualifies as conven-
tion by the way it perpetuates itself, and not by the way it originates. There is trust by 
convention whenever it is our reciprocal trust that, together with our desires for the 
end, gives us a reason to keep on trusting. 
Generalizing the definition in this way is faithful to Lewis’ analysis because no 
modification or additional clause has been proposed. Whether it is also fruitful to un-
derstand the peculiar normativity of conventions will be explored in what follows. 
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Since we intend to argue that such normativity stems from agreements, in the next 
section we turn to this issue. 
4   Agreements without promises 
It is natural, and correct, to view the practice of promising as a social device for mak-
ing agreements. It is also natural, but wrong, to consider agreements primarily as ‘an 
exchange of conditional promises’7. Though it’s true that such an exchange creates a 
binding agreement, even my unconditional promise to you is sufficient for creating an 
agreement between us on something I will do, no matter what. Mutual conditional 
promises may be the natural model for contracts, but they hardly are the general 
analysis of agreements, at least if, as Hume has suggested, agreements might exist be-
tween us without the interposition of any promise.   
In the contract view, agreements create obligations (and rights) on the parties en-
tering into it due to such exchange of conditional promises. However it is sensible to 
consider promises just as one possible way to create agreements. Another opportunity 
is to avail oneself of a suggestion of a third party that, if it meets the interests of all, 
might be jointly accepted. However, that an agreement be mutual is also dispensable. 
Giving permission, for instance, is a way to enter in an agreement, originating only 
unilateral obligations and rights. When an agent gives the permission to another to do 
something that he has the power to prevent, there is an agreement between the two 
that enables the latter agent to do some action. In this kind of agreement, an agent be-
comes obliged not to interfere with the other one, who at the same time acquires the 
right to act as agreed upon. But given that no promise has been formulated, where 
does exactly such normative consequences come from? 
An answer to this question is postponed to the next two sections because it is use-
ful, first of all, to clarify what an agreement primarily is.  
When there is an agreement between some agents, say Alice and Bob, the consent 
of at least one of them is necessary. When one consents, one is consenting somebody 
to something. Hence consenting creates a social relation between at least two agents.  
But what one is consenting to? Sometimes Bob consents Alice to do something, 
like when he consents her to use his car. Other times, Bob consents to do something 
himself, like when he accepts to pick the children from school. Other times it happens 
both that Bob consents Alice to use his car and that he gives her the keys. In all these 
situations, by consenting an agreement is established. In any case, consenting is re-
lated to the fulfilment of another agent’s desire that one can interfere with. This de-
sire might be to do something that one may impede (negative interference). Other 
times, the desire is that one does something to favour another one (positive interfer-
ence). Or a combination of both at the same time, like when Alice’s desire to do 
something depends on Bob creating some favourable conditions, something which 
she also desires. What is common to all these cases, it that an agent has the power to 
interfere somehow with another agent’s desire, and when the former consents that the 
latter fulfils such desire, it is entailed that the former does not interfere negatively 
                                                           
7 [26], see also [15]; [9] for a critique of this view. 
7
with it or that he interferes positively with it. For simplicity, from here on, we will 
just mention the negative interference situation. 
An agreement then creates a social relationship between the parties, and presup-
poses a pre-existing asymmetrical social relation of dependence between them.  When 
there is an agreement at least one agent that could (has the power to) interfere, is not 
interfering.  
However something stronger is needed to have a real agreement. Though it is true 
that a lion that is not hungry is consenting a gazelle to wander around him safely, the 
gazelle does not have the lion’s consent to do so and there is no agreement between 
them to this purpose. The gazelle does better to be ready to run as soon as the lion 
manifests any change of mind; she may exploit such temporary loss of interest but not 
rely on the lion only because the lion does not have a desire to interfere with her. Dif-
ferently, her reliance would be more justified if the lion could be able to communicate 
his decision (i.e. intention) not to interfere with the gazelle, that is, to express his con-
sent. Hence, one’s consent (not just a behaviour that happens to consent) to the ful-
filment of a desire of another agent is there when one has the intention not to interfere 
with such desire fulfilment. To be able to formulate such an intention one obviously is 
to be able and in condition to interfere, thus this condition presupposes the truth of the 
former.   
This unilateral consent, however, is still not enough. Suppose Alice and Bob live 
together, and Bob has bought a car. Though the car is legally owned by him, between 
them, Alice may not ‘acknowledge’ it as Bob’s because she does not consider the 
matter of who uses it as entirely up to him; she does not consider this choice as de-
pending on him alone. She knows that Bob has the keys, and that he has some sort of 
legal power to interfere with her free use of it (she could be charged of theft, for in-
stance). Alice also knows that she has Bob’s consent to using the car whenever she 
wanted to, but still she contests this power over her. In this case, though all the condi-
tions above might be true (i.e. Alice objectively depends on Bob, and Bob has de-
cided not to interfere with Alice), there is still no agreement between them. It might 
be said, that Alice uses the car despite the fact that Bob can (he has the power to) in-
terfere with her. To have a full agreement, then, there must be also an acknowledge-
ment of the power of interference of the agent who, in fact, has such power.   
Suppose now this variation of the example. Though the car is legally Bob’s, it is 
Bob that reject his own power over Alice, as far the use of the car is concerned. Alice 
may consider the matter of who uses the car as up to Bob, but Bob himself contests 
this fact. If Alice asks his permission to take the car, Bob replies that she does not 
have to ask for it, that it is her choice whether to take it or not. In this situation, again, 
there is no agreement between them that Alice uses the car, because, between them, 
though Bob has the power, he does not ‘value’ it. 
What is, then, to value a power, and what relation does it bear with power acknow-
ledgement?  
Valuing one’s power is not simply desiring to exercise it because it may happen 
that Bob can indeed desire to use it against Alice in a moment of sudden anger but 
then hates himself for such desire given that Bob in fact contests such an asymmetri-
cal relation between them. Bob does not desire to desire in this way towards Alice, 
that is, he does not value his power over her. One values one’s power when one de-
sires that the use of one’s power is motivated by one’s desire to do so, that is, when 
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one desires that it depends on one’s choice whether to interfere or not. Hence, in the 
latter example, despite the fact that Bob can in fact interfere with Alice and he could 
come to desire to exercise his power over her, he does not want to be so motivated, at 
least when it comes to have a power over her. This example makes clear that, to have 
an agreement, the agent values the power he has over the other one, the agent values 
the fact the he is able and in condition to interfere with the other8.  
Power acknowledgement, differently, is the acceptance of such power, that is, the 
decision to forbear to resist to the exercise of the power over oneself if the other 
wants to exercise it. Acknowledging the power of another makes manifest one’s fun-
damental non-hostility towards the other: to be prepared not to pursue something if 
this happens to be against the other’s desire. While in giving one’s consent, one ac-
cepts something one can interfere with (i.e. intends not to use a power of interference 
one has), power acknowledgement, differently, is just the acceptance of the use of 
such power, that is, the intention not to resist to the decision of the other agent. Both 
valuing one’s power of interference and the acknowledgement of another agent’s 
power of interference are necessary conditions to enter in an agreement.  
Consider now this example. Alice wants to use Bob’s car tomorrow, she has his 
consent, and she acknowledges his power on this matter. Notwithstanding so, to be 
safe in case something happens, Alice books a taxi for tomorrow morning. Suppose 
that Alice is quite sure that, intending not to interfere with her use of the car, he will 
so behave. But still she is worried that something unexpected might turn out. Assum-
ing a worst-case scenario (which she considers highly improbable anyway), Alice de-
cides not to rely on Bob. It seems that, in this situation, if Alice does not uptake Bob’s 
consent, no agreement between them has been established. And uptake precisely is 
such reliance on one’s part on another agent’s intention not to interfere with one’s 
desire fulfilment.  
Finally, even if such condition is needed, it is not in itself sufficient for creating an 
agreement. In fact, Bob may know that she has a very important meeting tomorrow 
and that she needs the car. To avoid creating any obstacle, Bob decides to refrain 
from taking the car in the morning but he does this without that she realizes this inten-
tion of not interference, hence she does not uptake his consent though she would in 
case she knew about it. While Bob’s intention of not interference is present, her igno-
rance of such intention makes it the case that they have no agreement that Alice uses 
the car today, and she may decide to call the taxi. Knowing that another agent has the 
power of interfering with oneself, and knowing that the other intends not to exercise 
such power is needed to have an agreement. But, as it is standard in many social in-
teractions, even such first-order knowledge isn’t enough to have an agreement be-
cause Alice may know this fact while Bob does not know that she knows it and, on 
this basis, Bob may think she will act otherwise and so in the end deciding to pick the 
car on the assumption that Alice may have decided to call a taxi, and so on for all the 
levels. In any agreement, then, an epistemic condition is necessary, that is, there 
should be common knowledge of the intention to not interfere. The same reasoning 
supports also other epistemic conditions. An agreement, in fact, cannot be in place un-
less the agent, who is consenting to the other’s desire fulfilment, knows about such 
desire in the first place. And again this fact must be out in the open by being common 
                                                           
8 On valuing and second-order desires see [7] and [20]; for a critique see [31]. 
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knowledge that an agent has the power to interfere with a desire of another one who 
in fact has such desire.  The acknowledgment of such power made by the other agent 
also must be matter of common knowledge, given that an agreement basically is a 
way to obtain something one wants without coercing the other to do so. And, finally, 
both the valuing of one’s power and that the uptake of the consent are again matter of 
common knowledge between the agents.  
Let’s take stock.  
 
A social relationship between at least two agents is an agreement between them if 
and only if the following five conditions hold:  
1. The agent having the power of interference intends (for some reason) not to inter-
fere with the other agent’s desire fulfilment (consent condition);  
2. The agent having the power of interference values his own power (valuing one’s 
power condition) 
3. The agent, who is subject to interference, acknowledges the power of the other 
one, that is, he intends to refrain from pursuing his desire if the other desire that he 
so behaves (no coercion condition); 
4. The agent, who is subject to interference, relies on the consent of the other one, 
that is, intends to pursue his desire on the assumption that the other one intends not 
to interfere (uptake condition); 
5. All conditions above are common knowledge.  
 
An agreement of this sort may be called unconditional, in the sense that one does 
not give one’s consent on condition of another agent’s consent. Differently, an ex-
change of conditional promises gives rise to a conditional agreement in which each 
consent is conditioned on the other. Contracts, for instance, are instances of condi-
tional agreements.   
Moreover, on this analysis, it is also evident that there can be agreements without 
promises. Agreements are particular kinds of social relations between the agents, and 
a promise is one possible way to establish such relations (see also Section 6). Other 
possibilities, such as a mere exchange of a request and an acceptance or a mere uni-
lateral permission without any request, make it clear that no promise is indeed neces-
sary.  
5   The principle of reliability 
All agreements have normative consequences, even those that are unconditional and 
established without the interposition of a promise. However, on the present analysis, 
an agreement is primarily a social relation characterized by specific motivational and 
epistemic conditions that are true of the agents entering into it, and so no normative 
relation has been so far mentioned. How, on this account, is it possible to explain the 
‘obligation’ of the consenting agent, and the corresponding ‘right’ to do or to obtain 
what an agent has been consented to? Or, differently put, what is the wrong of in-
fringing an agreement?  
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In our view, the wrong of violating an agreement not made through promises is of 
the same family of the wrong one would commit if the agreement were promise-
based. Both situations, in fact, pertain to a more general kind of social interactions 
that are wrong in relation to “what we owe to each other when we have led them to 
form expectations about our future conduct” [27].  
The moral Principle of Fidelity put forward by Thomas Scanlon in this seminal pa-
per was intended to account for the wrong of breaking a promise, and, as such, may 
be too strong for the kinds of agreement without promises we are after. However 
Scanlon has also insisted on several moral principles bearing family resemblances 
with each other given that all are related to the elicitation of expectations in others. To 
account for the normativity of agreements without promises the so-called principle of 
Loss Prevention could be enough [27]. This principle requires that one that has inten-
tionally or negligently led someone to expect that one will follow a certain course of 
action, and has reason to believe that that person will suffer significant loss as a re-
sult of this expectation if one does not fulfil it, must take reasonable steps to prevent 
that loss, that is, he ought to warn, fulfil the expectation or compensate.  
The fact that the principle is not just to prevent another agent’s desires frustration 
but losses, indicates that some form of reliance is presupposed for the principle to be 
applicable. Suppose, in fact, that Bob had, somehow, led Alice to expect that he won’t 
take the car tomorrow morning, say because he knows that she heard him accepting a 
lift from a colleague on the phone. Bob knows that she cares about this fact given that 
she needs the car.  Still Alice decides not to rely on Bob as for having the car at her 
disposal tomorrow, and, to be completely safe, she books a taxi.  Knowing this, Bob 
is under no obligation towards Alice, not even to warn her that in the end he will take 
the car.  Though taking the car might be something she desires more than just taking 
whatever means of transportation, the frustration of this desire of her is not a loss Al-
ice incurs with, it is not something she has and she wants which she is deprived of, 
hence the principle of Loss Prevention does not apply. Under this respect, even in the 
case that she had relied upon Bob and decided not to call the taxi, the very fact that 
the desire is frustrated when Bob instead took the car is not a real loss9. However in 
relying on Bob, Alice has in fact lost something she had before her. She has paid 
some costs, opportunity costs as the economists call them, which are the available al-
ternatives of actions she had and which she has renounced to pursue by counting upon 
Bob’s car being available.  
At least for the aim of this article, then, the way Judith Thomson has defended a 
similar principle seems better suited [29]. Thomson, in fact, argues for the validity of 
a Word-Giving Thesis in which, when an agent invites another one to rely on the truth 
of a certain proposition, which invitation the latter agent accepts (or uptakes), then the 
latter agent acquires a claim (i.e. a right) against the former one to its being true. This 
way of formulating the moral principle bears two main advantages over Scanlon’s: 
firstly, it makes explicit the relevance of reliance or uptake in the process, and, sec-
ondly, it generalize it towards whatever proposition one may rely upon beside those 
that refer to an action one will do in the future.   
                                                           
9 Though it can be so when I consider the desire to have the car not as something I am to 
achieve but as something already achieved and to be protected, see for this possibility and its 
psychological plausibility [22]. 
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However, though one can induce reliance, one can allow reliance as well and in 
such a way to have normative consequences.  
Consider again the example above: Alice heard Bob’s conversation with somebody 
else and, as a consequence, she comes to believe that Bob will not take the car and 
she relies on it. In this case, Bob has unintentionally induced in Alice some kind of 
reliance. We have suggested that by acting on these expectations about Bob, she will 
incur in some losses, and so the principle of Loss Prevention might apply. But is it 
so? After all, such induced reliance in this case is not intentional; can Bob be respon-
sible for Alice’s unilateral decision to rely upon him in this situation?  It seems cor-
rect to say that though her reliance has been only involuntary induced, at least Bob 
has allowed her to rely on him. More precisely, in fact, to allow a belief or an action 
is to have the power to disconfirm another’s belief (which is a reason to believe some-
thing else or to act in some way) and to forbear to disconfirm it. If hearing what Bob 
has said on the phone is a reason for Alice to believe that he will not take the car to-
morrow, then this belief is obviously something that Bob can disconfirm. By not dis-
confirming such belief, Bob is also allowing her to believe in this way. Granted this, 
as such this form of allowing is still not sufficient for an agent to acquire a claim 
against another one. Suppose in fact that, immediately after having realized her reli-
ance, Bob tells her that what is true is just that he does not confirm that he will take 
the car (which is the same of not disconfirming the belief that Bob will not take it) 
and nothing more than that. Can Alice hold him responsible for her losses if in the 
end he decides to take the car despite her unilateral reliance? It seems not. Suppose 
differently that just after his conversation on the phone and knowing that she needs 
the car, Bob turns to Alice and say ‘yes, you heard correctly. I won’t take it!’. By con-
firming a belief that he has unintentionally induced in her, Bob then become obliged 
towards her to warn in case he changed your mind, or, if it’s too late, to do as ex-
pected or to compensate. Because such confirmation of the belief logically entails the 
absence of a disconfirmation, even in this case Bob has allowed her to believe some-
thing, though not passively (i.e. by forbearing to disconfirm it) but actively (i.e. by 
confirming it). It is this form of ‘active’ allowing that is necessary for the moral prin-
ciple to apply when one does not induce intentionally reliance in others10.  
Finally, there are also cases in which one actively allows other agents’ reliance on 
oneself that one has not in any way induced.  
Suppose for example that Alice believes that Bob will not take the car tomorrow 
because John told her so, and that she relies on him for having the car. Bob knows 
about all this and he allows her to believe it (i.e. he forbears to disconfirm such be-
lief). If she just act on this basis, and she does not know that Bob knows about her re-
liance, it seems that at most Bob should warn her if the belief is false, but if this is so, 
it is just out of sheer altruism11. If, differently, Bob has confirmed this expectation of 
                                                           
10 Scanlon’s principle of Loss Prevention indeed mentions also leading expectations negli-
gently, besides doing it intentionally. However, negligence implies having not paid due care to 
avoid such reliance, and so it cannot be evoked to explain, without circularity, a principle 
which normatively demands such behaviour. Differently, our notion of active or confirmatory 
allowing has not such problem.  
11 The reason why common knowledge of another’s forbearance to disconfirm one’s beliefs 
may change the situation will be discussed in the Section 7.  
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her, for instance by nodding, Bob has actively allowed her to rely on him, and, from 
there on, he is responsible for her possible losses even if he has not induced that belief 
in the first place. Again, when it’s too late for warning, Bob ought to fulfil the expec-
tation or compensate.  
To sum up, according to the view adopted in this paper, an agreement has norma-
tive consequences because the agent consenting another one to fulfil his desire is ei-
ther intentionally inducing or actively allowing uptake on the consent is concerned 
(i.e. reliance that the former one intends not to interfere with such desire fulfilment), 
and, by doing so, undertakes a duty of reliability against the other one and creates a 
corresponding right to rely. Reliability is normatively required to prevent losses 
caused by intentionally inducing or actively allowing such reliance. One way in 
which such principle can be explicitly formulated is the following: if one intentionally 
induces or actively allows another agent to rely on the truth of a certain proposition, 
then the latter one acquires a right to reliability (i.e. to be warned if the proposition 
turns to be false, or, in case the proposition is about the future action of the former 
one and it is too late for warning, a right that the former one acts so as to make the 
proposition true or to be compensated for the incurred losses). For these reasons, we 
name such a principle: the principle of Reliability.    
6   The normativity of agreements and the value of not having 
hostile attitudes 
Thus, by establishing an agreement between the agents at least one of them intention-
ally induces or actively allows the uptake of the other one. From this it follows that 
the uptaking agent acquires a right to rely on the other one. But what exactly he has a 
right to rely on?  
We have suggested above that if there is an agreement between Alice and Bob that 
Alice will take his car tomorrow, his taking the car is doing something wrong. Under 
this perspective, by uptaking the consent, one acquires a right on a certain behaviour: 
i.e. that the other does not interfere with his desire fulfilment. But it seems even more 
than this: even if Bob does not take the car but afterwards he manifests some uneasi-
ness because she has taken it, it seems again that Bob is doing something wrong. If 
agreements were there only to rule behaviours, what Bob has done should be enough 
for complying with its terms. However it looks like that it is not.  
To understand why it is so, and what the peculiar normativity of an agreement is, 
consider the difference between the mere fact that some agents agree in their desires 
and the fact that there is a social relation of agreement between them.  
When they agree in desires “the same world would satisfies the desires of both” 
[20] possibly without any social relation between them whatsoever. Differently, when 
there is an agreement there is also a social relation between them that aims precisely 
to create such agreement in desires but facing the fact the things could have been dif-
ferent. In fact, as we have noted above, an agreement presupposes an asymmetrical 
relation of power and dependence between the agents so that one can influence the 
fulfilment of the desires of the other.   
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However by acknowledging such power, one also signals one’s basic non-hostility, 
that is, one’s desire not to be motivated to do an action against the desire of an agent 
that has and values his power of interference. Correspondently, for whatever reason 
an agent decides to do so, by giving the consent, an agent also signals that the fulfil-
ment of such desire ‘agrees’ with his own desire in the present conditions (i.e. the 
agent for some reason desires not interfere with the other). Thus, an agreement results 
in the fact that the agents mutually know that their actual desires agree: they are 
jointly co-realizable and they are so without any coercion.  
Consider now the principle of Reliability. The similar principle of Loss Prevention 
is justified for Scanlon on a contractualist basis by the fact that “it is not unreasonable 
to refuse to grant others the freedom to ignore the losses caused by the expectation 
they intentionally or negligently lead others to form” [27]. One reason to refuse such 
freedom is readily available if the agents share a value of not being motivated by hos-
tile attitudes12. In fact, ignoring such losses, when one has intentionally induced or ac-
tively confirmed an expectation on oneself, would be tantamount to be motivated by a 
hostile attitude: either one desires that the other incurs in those losses or at least lacks 
the desire that the other does not incur into them.  Let’s assume, then, that our agents 
share this value so that the principle of Reliability, as it has been here formulated, 
would just follow.  
According to Lewis’ dispositional theory [20], this would be a value de se, that is, 
a property that the agents are disposed to desire to desire (i.e. to value) under ideal 
conditions. The value of not being motivated by a hostile attitude amounts, then, to 
the fact that, if the agents are under ideal conditions, they are disposed to desire to de-
sire to have such a property. Moreover, given that being motivated by a hostile atti-
tude is being motivated to frustrate the desires of another agent, the compliance with 
such value requires them to revise their possible first-order hostile desires in a way 
that would inevitably result in the creation of harmony in the population, that is, in 
desires that agree.  
Sharing the value however does not necessarily mean that the agents will behave 
according to what is required of them in the present conditions. It would of course in 
case they were in ideal ones, but no one is a saint, that is, no one lives always up to 
one’s values. However, between agents that enter in a social interaction, such value 
can at least ground the presupposition that the other fellows will be so motivated, oth-
erwise the best one can do is to avoid any possible contact with them. 
What is then, on this basis, the peculiar normativity of agreements as social rela-
tions?  
Recall that in giving one’s consent, one induces or actively allows another agent’s 
reliance on the consent, that is, not just on the observable behaviour of not interfer-
ence but, more specifically, on the decision not to interfere. Moreover, given the de-
tails of the social interaction between the agents, it is also manifest that the decision is 
based on the fact that the desire of the consenting agent agrees with that of the other. 
It is on the decision based on this ‘agreeing’ desire that the other rely upon, if he 
wants to be non-hostile with the other. As a consequence, and given the principle of 
Reliability, those who uptake a consent acquire a right to such decision of not inter-
                                                           




ference based on an agreement in desires. Thus, the consenting agent that is willing 
to enter an agreement is not only obligated not to interfere (i.e. not to take the car 
himself), he is in fact bound not to change his mind otherwise the basic non hostile at-
titude of the agent would be frustrated: he is bound not to come to desire to interfere 
with the other. When giving one’s consent, one is obliged to keep one’s desire in 
agreement with the other.  For this reason, it turns out that it is illegitimate even the 
expression of Bob’s uneasiness with what Alice has done since such reaction on his 
part would signal that Bob has indeed changed his mind.  
Is the other also bound similarly? We think so. In fact, the consent is given, and the 
decision is taken, on the assumption that the other agent has the desire in question (i.e. 
she wants to take the car): Bob relies on this fact and Alice has induced him to so 
rely. Hence Alice is bound too not to change her desire, on pain of being hostile with 
Bob, given that the opportunity costs he has paid to eventually decide not to interfere 
with her would then become just induced losses.  
Hence, even in an unconditional agreement as this one, there are reciprocal obliga-
tions and reciprocal rights. By establishing an agreement between them, the agents 
become reciprocally obligated and entitled to keep their mutually known desires in 
agreement13.  
Does this entail hence that an exchange of promises has indeed occurred? No. By 
promising one creates the expectation that the promisor will do an action in the future 
unless the other consent to not doing so [27]. When giving one’s consent without the 
interposition of a promise a timely warning can still be enough to release oneself from 
an obligation, at least when the other has not lost valuable alternatives to satisfy his 
desire. Agreements not based on promises are just weaker than agreements based on 
promises. They aim to create and protect desires that agree, and they do so for agents 
that share the value of not having hostile attitudes.  
7   The ambiguity of silence and tacit confirmation 
Now, suppose that it is common knowledge between Alice and Bob that Alice wants 
his car tomorrow morning, and that Alice believes that he will not take it because to-
morrow is Monday, and on Mondays Bob never takes it (maybe just because it is his 
habit to act in this way or because the traffic on Monday mornings is more intense 
than in the other days and Bob hates to be stuck in traffic). Given that she believes 
that he has his own reasons for not taking the car, and she knows that he usually act in 
this way on Mondays, it is reasonable for her to expect Bob to behave in this way this 
Monday too (i.e. she believes with some probability that this will happen). Alice so 
believes this that she relies on him for not taking the car, and she decides to go to the 
meeting with his car. All above being common knowledge between them, she also 
observes that Bob has kept silent about the truth of this belief until Monday morning. 
However, just when the time has come, Bob decides to take the car, say because it 
                                                           
13 More precisely, the obligation is to keep one’s first-order desires in agreement. Such an obli-
gation can be seen as a reason for all the parties to the agreement to have a second-order de-
sire that their first-order desires keep motivating their behaviour. Those second-order desires 
would motivate the agents to do whatever they can to avoid to revise their first-order desires.  
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happens that today he needs the car for some unanticipated errands. Has Bob done 
something wrong?  
It is foreseeable that having incurred in some losses, Alice may resent Bob’s late 
decision, and she may even protest about such sudden change of mind. But, is she en-
titled to anything? Is Bob under a sort of duty towards her? In case she thought that 
way, Bob could legitimately claim to have not given her any consent to use the car, 
not even acted in order to make her believe something about him, that is, not even 
implicitly consenting her to something. So why would be Bob responsible for her 
losses? In the end, he has not intentionally induced any reliance on himself nor he 
said ‘yes’ or any other kind of confirmation because, by assumption, no communica-
tion between them has occurred.   
Granted this, however something strange has indeed happened.  
The closer she come to the fulfilment of her expectation, the more she feel sure 
about such fulfilment and entitled towards the other acting as expected. It is a fact 
that, though Bob knew about her belief, he kept silent until the moment has come, that 
is, that Bob has not disconfirmed her belief.  
Suppose that Alice has interpreted this silent behaviour as a confirmation of her be-
lief that Bob won’t take the car, and then she has felt that such confirmation has 
somehow entitled her to have the car. But what kind of confirmation is this given that 
they do not communicate? Is it reasonable to read the other’s silent behaviour in this 
way? And how can the omission of a disconfirmation create duties and rights? 
To understand this issue more clearly, suppose that Alice is a Bayesian rational 
agent, that is, suppose that Hi is her hypothesis that Bob will not take the car tomor-
row that is characterized by a subjective probability p(Hi), representing her degree in 
belief in Hi. Because beliefs are represented by a well-defined additive probability 
function [27], her degree of disbelief in Hi  is given by 1- p(Hi). We can imagine such 
beliefs be warranted by inductive reasoning in which Alice has acknowledged that 
there is a pattern governing Bob’s behaviour such that, almost on every Monday Bob 
does not take his car or, simply, that not taking the car on Monday is his best choice 
given his desire not be stuck in traffic.  
Suppose that given Alice’s concern on what Bob will do this Monday, she starts 
looking for additional evidences for her belief that he won’t indeed take the car. As-
suming, as we have done above, that everything is common knowledge between 
them, she happens to notice that Bob keeps silent about the truth of this belief she has 
about him, though he knows that she has decided to rely upon him.  
The observation of silence, from a Bayesian perspective, can be treated as a ‘da-
tum’ S for determining whether Alice’s belief about Bob is true or false. Hence, by 
applying the Bayes’ theorem, the belief can be updated accordingly. Moreover, such 
update of Hi must be determined relative to its complement ¬Hi, as the usual formula 
makes clear:  
! 
p(H | S)





As a Bayesian rational agent, Alice is interested in the impact of the fact that Bob 
is silent on her belief that Bob will not take the car tomorrow, which amounts to cal-
culating the probability that her belief is true, given that she has observed his silence. 
To do this, as a Bayesian rational agent, she needs to compute the posterior (i.e. the 
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odds that Hi is true in light of what is known after the observation of S) that equals the 
likelihood ratio (i.e. the second term from the right representing the information value 
of S with respect to the truth of Hi) multiplied for the priors that Hi and ¬Hi are true 
before the observation of S.  In such an inference, in case the probability of observing 
S when Hi  is true differed from when is not true, the likelihood ratio would be differ-
ent from 1, and the posterior would also differ. In particular, the datum (i.e. Bob’s si-
lence) favours the hypothesis Hi when the posterior odds are greater, and this happens 
when the conditional probability of his silence given that Alice’s belief about him is 
true is larger than the conditional probability of Bob’s silence given that her belief 
about Bob is false. In such a case, it is said that the observation of S is diagnostic of 
or confirms Hi and not ¬Hi.  
Silence clearly is ambivalent evidence in that there are both reasons for believing 
that it supports Alice’s belief about Bob (if Bob does not want to take the car, he does 
not inform Alice that he will instead take it) as well reasons to believe that it can dis-
confirm my belief: it may be possible that Bob could not reach her in time or that he 
has forgotten her desire to have the car, or that he simply does not care about Alice 
enough to let her know something relevant for her, or that Bob wants to harm her on 
purpose and so on. Whether the evidence is relatively more confirmatory than not is a 
contingent matter, and depends on the ratio between the known conditional probabili-
ties of observing silence on condition that my belief is true or false. If she is Bayesian 
rational agent, she compares these information values before updating her belief.  
There are, however, (psychological) reasons to believe that Alice, as all of us, is 
not so rational.  
It is in fact one of the “best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential 
error” [6] that human reasoning gives undue weight to evidence that supports one’s 
beliefs while discounting evidence that would tell against it, and this tendency is 
called confirmatory bias14. A confirmatory bias can be discovered in many different 
situations in which one assesses the truthfulness of one’s beliefs. However the scien-
tific evidence is particularly vivid when one is both concerned in what one believes  
(the so-called motivated confirmation bias) and the evidence one is evaluating is am-
biguous (i.e. it is partly supportive and partly not without exactly knowing how much 
it is so). In this kind of situations, there is a very strong tendency to interpret informa-
tion in ways that are partial to one’s beliefs, and in particular, in ways in which the 
positive side of the evidence is overemphasized.  
On the basis of these empirical facts, it is seems plausible to assume that there is an 
analogously strong tendency to read other’s silence, in the kind of situations we are 
interested in, as a positive evidence for one’s belief. In fact, the ambivalence of si-
lence would not be too much of a problem if silence were not often an ambiguous 
evidence in that one is not so sure on how to assess such ambivalence, whether the 
positive support to one’s hypothesis is more likely than the negative one (Ellsberg 
1961). In the case at hand, ambiguity about the evidential value of silence can be seen 
as a form of uncertainty about the relative conditional probabilities of p(S|Hi) and 
p(S|¬Hi). The agent does not know what the likelihood ratio is because it is as if he 
considered as reasonable, in the present circumstances, more than one distribution of 
                                                           
14 See [23] for a review of the relevant psychological literature; see [25] for a mathematical 
model, though focussed on a different aspect of the confirmatory bias. 
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conditional probabilities of observing silence, given that the hypothesis is true or 
false.  
If we accept the confirmatory bias, it may be suggested that, in contexts where we 
already entertain the relevant belief, we update it by adopting the best expectation that 
could be associated with the observed evidence, which is the one that would confirm 
the belief already accepted. In other words, silence regarding one’s belief, that is, the 
forbearance to disconfirm such belief means, for the agent holding the relevant belief, 
that the other one will act as expected. 
To interpret silence in this way, one must think that the other is not hostile towards 
oneself, otherwise, if this were not the case, if he believed in the other’s hostility, then 
the negative side of evidence would be maximally relevant. However, as we have as-
sumed above, such non-hostility is a reasonable presupposition for agents that interact 
with each other. Under this presupposition of non-hostility, it is reasonable to con-
sider that the ‘natural’ meaning of silence is confirmatory.  
It is then understandable why the more Alice is close to fulfil her desire that Bob 
does not take the car, the more she is sure that he will not take it. Supposing that she 
has checked upon him several times until Monday morning arrives, each time Bob’s 
silence has confirmed her belief possibly up to certainty.  
So far so good for the expectation that Bob will not take the car becoming firmer 
(i.e. confirmed). But what about the fact that she also feels entitled that he does not 
take it?  
First of all, given that the confirmatory meaning of silence is salient between them 
(Bob is a confirmatory agent just as Alice is) and he knows that he has not discon-
firmed a belief she had about him, Alice has reasons to believe that Bob cannot but 
assent to her interpretation (at least from the perspective of bounded rationality): that 
Bob’s silence means that Bob will act as expected is ‘natural’ or salient in this context 
(i.e. it is the obvious interpretation for confirmatory and non-hostile agents). If Bob 
has reasons to assent to Alice’s belief, he has reasons to believe that it is reasonable to 
believe something in those circumstances and so he has reason to believe that he has 
as a matter of fact confirmed Alice’s belief about him. If the salience of precedence 
suffices to justify the commonality of our beliefs in future conformity to a convention 
[15], the salience of silence might justify a mutual belief in the occurrence of confir-
mation. 
One relevant consequence of such common knowledge is that, though at the begin-
ning Bob were just ‘passively’ allowing Alice to believe something about him, under 
these conditions of common knowledge of his confirmation, the allowing becomes 
‘active’.  
Moreover, given what we have discussed in Section 5, this is sufficient for the 
Principle of Reliability to apply, giving rise to Bob’s duty of reliability and to Alice’s 
corresponding right to rely. And from this it follows that her possible protest or re-
sentment cannot but be entitled simply because she has a right that he does as ex-
pected, that is, that he is reliable.  
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8   Tacit agreements: when the agreement is implicated 
Even if agreements can be established without promises, usually other kinds of 
speech acts are employed to create the required epistemic conditions behind them. For 
instance, for an agent to consent another one to something that is desired, the former 
needs to know about such desire in the first place. Usually, the latter communicates 
the desire simply by informing, or by formulating a request or, sometimes, by propos-
ing an exchange, and so aiming to offer a reason to motivate the former acceptance. A 
conditional promise is first of all a way to influence such acceptance by offering some 
incentives. Similarly, the consent must be mutually known between the parties, and, 
to this end, one’s the intention not to interfere with the other’s desire fulfilment is 
usually communicated. This is often done through explicit communication, that is, by 
conventionally signalling one’s agreement through nodding or using verbal commu-
nication.  
However, I can inform you about my desire just by taking the keys of your car, 
knowing that you are looking at me, and that you will infer the desire behind my 
behaviour. Analogously, by acting in order to remove an obstacle for me or by 
avoiding creating one, you can communicate with me without language, gestures or 
other conventional means. In fact, practical actions (or forbearances) done with a 
communicative intention (i.e. practical actions done also because another agent while 
‘reading’ such behaviour will believe something) might suffice to send a message. 
Elsewhere, we have argued for the importance of this kind of communication that we 
name ‘behavioural implicit communication’ [2] [30]. Here, we just confine ourselves 
to suggest that this form of communication through practical actions and their effects 
might support the creation of agreements that can be dubbed, for this reason, implicit 
agreements. When there is an implicit agreement between some agents, the one hav-
ing the power to interfere with the other can implicitly give his consent by acting with 
the intention to refrain from interfering, knowing that the other understands what is 
happening. Those that are qualified as ‘tacit’ are often instances of agreements estab-
lished, silently, via implicit communication.  
Notwithstanding so, if there are cases in which it is already common knowledge 
between the agents that one of them wants something, even implicit communication 
may be useless; similarly for the consent, the uptake, and all the conditions that need 
to be commonly known for an agreement to be in place.  
But how is it possible that all these epistemic conditions be satisfied, without either 
promises or any other kind of communication between the parties? Or, in other words, 
how is it possible to have agreements without communication?  
Recall the necessary and sufficient conditions to have an agreement discussed in 
Section 4. One prominent clause is the so-called ‘consent condition’. In the way it has 
been formulated, such condition does not require any communication. In fact, having 
another agent’s consent just entails that the agent with the power to interfere, indeed, 
intends not to interfere. However, often, one does not only consent to something, but 
one also gives one’s consent, which necessarily is the communication of such deci-
sion of non-interference, via the usual Gricean mechanism [11]. One can give one’s 
consent without verbal or gestural communication, but at least implicit communica-
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tion is necessary. However, though one cannot be given the consent without commu-
nication, one can have the tacit consent without any communication.   
Consider again the example discussed in the previous section. 
It has been shown that when the parties consider silence as a confirmatory device 
for the beliefs on the truth of which one relies, the confirming agent becomes obliged 
to be reliable, even if no communication has occurred between them. In the example, 
Bob become obliged not to take the car tomorrow, given his tacit confirmation of a 
belief Alice had about him. However the mere fact of not taking the car, and as a con-
sequence of not interfering with her is not in itself sufficient for Alice to have his con-
sent. According to the analysis developed in Section 4, if one has a consent then the 
other agent has the intention not to interfere with him, that is, the consent implies that 
the content of the intention refers to another agent. Differently, the intention behind 
the behaviour that contingently happens not to create obstacles for another agent 
needs not be so. Indeed, in the example, the decision not to take the car on Monday is 
motivated either because that is Bob’s habit on Mondays or because it is the best op-
tion he has to avoid being stuck in traffic.  
However, as noted in Section 5, once the principle of Reliability applies, one in-
curs in a ‘directed’ obligation, rather than an unqualified one: Bob is obliged towards 
Alice not to take the car, and Alice has a right against Bob to this behaviour. There-
fore, such a directed obligation is not simply to avoid taking the car, but, more pre-
cisely, to forbear to do what would, in this context, prevent her to fulfil her desire that 
Bob does not the car, which amounts to being obliged to not interfere with such desire 
fulfilment.  
Granted this, is it true that Bob’s silence also means that he intends not to interfere 
with Alice, i.e. that she has his consent? 
Recall that Bob’s silence is confirmatory of her belief about him under the presup-
position of non-hostility; otherwise the disconfirmatory reading of the evidence 
would be maximally relevant. The presupposition that Bob desires not to be moved by 
a hostile attitude, however, amounts to assuming that the principle of Reliability is ac-
tually followed.  
To see why it is so, consider Lewis’ analysis of the kinematics of presuppositions 
in a conversation [19]. According to Lewis: “presuppositions evolves according to a 
rule of accommodation specifying that any presuppositions that are required by what 
is said straightway come into existence, provided that nobody objects” [19]. Though 
presuppositions are almost always approached in the contest of communication, the 
fact that social interaction, even tacit as in this case, may have the same properties 
and consequences of linguistic exchanges and proper conversations is explicitly en-
dorsed by some pragmatists [14]. If a presupposition of reciprocal non-hostility, pos-
sibly grounded in a shared value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes, is rea-
sonable, then what is required ‘by what is done’ when one is in a social interaction 
with another agent becomes immediately into existence. That is, it becomes common 
knowledge between the agents that both of them share a value de se not to be moti-
vated by hostile attitudes. In the present context, Bob’s violation of the principle of 
Reliability would amount to actively allowing that Alice incurred into losses, and he 
would be indeed hostile towards her. If we accept that there is such a presupposition 
of non-hostility in the background of this kind of interactions, then we are also ac-
cepting that there is a shared assumption between the agents that principle of Reliabil-
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ity is indeed followed. Under these conditions, and given that Bob’s silence con-
firmed the belief that he will not take the car, and that he is consequently obliged not 
to interfere with her, his silence also means that he intends not to interfere with Alice 
or that she has his consent that her desire is fulfilled. More precisely, if in this context 
one’s silence “naturally” means one’s confirmation [11], it also “implicates” one’s 
consent [12]: that an agent intends not to interfere with another one or that the latter 
has the consent of the former is an “implicature” of such tacit confirmation because it 
is required that the former agent has such an intention in order to preserve the shared 
assumption that he is not hostile towards the other, or, which is the same, that he is 
not violating the principle of Reliability since this is something that the latter is as-
suming the other is not doing15.  
To sum up, given a shared assumption of non-hostility and thanks to the process of 
tacit confirmation, Alice knows that Bob also has a sufficient reason, a normative rea-
son, for consenting her to something that she wants, that is, he desire that Bob does 
not take the car this Monday. Under the same assumption of non-hostility, which in 
this context amounts to the assumption that the principle of Reliability is followed, 
she also has reason to believe that Bob intends not to interfere with her since, by be-
ing silent, he implicates that she has his consent. Moreover, given that the assumption 
of non-hostility is shared by the agents, and that both the tacit confirmation and the 
normative consequences are common knowledge, it is also commonly known that 
Bob’s silence means (implicates) his consent. It is this kind of consent that we con-
sider a tacit consent, that is, consent without any communication between the parties, 
which is tacit in the sense that is implicated by something your are doing and from 
what is already commonly known and assumed by the agents. As a consequence that 
Alice has such tacit consent is also commonly known without having been manifested 
in any way, that is, without Bob giving it to her. 
Let’s now consider conditions 2 and 3: the valuing one’s power and the no coer-
cion conditions.  
An agreement between them that Bob does not take the car entails also (1), that he 
desires that it is his desire to use or not to use the power over her to move him to act 
and (2) that Alice acknowledges this power over her as far as this issue is concerned, 
that is, she intends not to oppose Bob’s decision to interfere with her desire fulfil-
ment.  
However, there has been no deliberation to consent her to something in the first 
place, and Bob’s tacit consent is just implicated by something he did. So, how can 
such consent be compatible with Bob valuing his power?   
This is the same objection put forward by Hume against Locke’s famous justifica-
tion of political authority. Hume in fact in his Of the Original Contract has resisted 
the claim that such authority is the product of a tacit consent whereby “the subjects 
have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign” on the account that, “an 
                                                           
15 ‘Implicatures’, like presuppositions, are usually approached in the context of conversation, a 
situation in which we use language for common aims in a way that, as Grice has suggested, 
is governed by a Cooperative Principle. However Grice notoriously claimed also that the 
principle and the related maxims apply to cooperative contexts that are not communicative 
[12]. The relation between Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the weaker principle of Reli-
ability exceeds the scope of this contribution and are left for future research.   
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implied consent can only have place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends 
on his choice”, that is, where a man imagines that by desiring to interfere, he would 
thereby have successfully exercised his power.  Whether this is so in relation to po-
litical authority is not of our concern here, but still for an agreement to be in place 
such condition, or better, conditions 2 and 3 of an agreement must be met.  
We have argued above that the consent is normatively required by the fact that Bob 
has actively allowed Alice’s reliance. Even if it is required, this does not mean that 
the consent has been coerced or that no other alternative was indeed possible. In fact, 
if he had not confirmed her belief, she would have accepted his decision to act in 
ways that interfered with her desire fulfilment. The truth of this counterfactual, to-
gether with the fact that Bob has indeed confirmed her belief about him are also suffi-
cient to guarantee that, though she does acknowledge his power over her in this con-
text, she is now entitled to fulfil her desire. But how can the agents mutually know 
that such a counterfactual is true of them?  
Simply because the shared assumption of non-hostility requires it too. Suppose in 
fact that Bob thought differently. Bob imagines that even in case he hastened to 
disconfirm Alice’s belief, she would have pursued her desire in any case. This belief 
is incompatible with the truth of proposition that Alice values non-hostility as much 
as Bob does. Given that there was indeed an alternative to what has happened (Bob 
could have disconfirmed her belief but he didn’t) Bob has to assume, if the shared as-
sumption is to be considered true, that she would have behaved in non-hostile way. 
Hence, both conditions 2 and 3 are also satisfied, or better implicated, by what it is al-
ready common knowledge between them.  
Moreover since both the fact that he is moved by a desire not to interfere with her 
and that she acknowledges his power are implicated on the background of what they 
already commonly know, both conditions are common knowledge, or at least poten-
tially so.  
Finally, for the social relation between the agents to qualify as an agreement, as al-
ready argued, the agent having the consent needs to uptake it (condition 4) and this 
fact must be common knowledge between the parties. 
At first glance it may seem that this condition is already established because, in the 
example, Alice is in fact already relying on Bob not taking the car tomorrow. How-
ever, the uptake of an agreement is not just reliance on another’s behaviour that hap-
pens not to interfere with one’s desire but is, more specifically, reliance on the other’s 
intention not to interfere with such desire fulfilment (see Section 4); to have an 
agreement one does not merely rely on another’s behaviour, one relies on an inten-
tion, that is, one uptakes a consent.  
Since however, in the example, condition 1 is satisfied, Alice also has the opportu-
nity to rely on his intention not to interfere with her desire fulfilment, and not simply 
on his observable behaviour.  But how can such uptake on her part be common 
knowledge between them?  
Suppose that she does not in fact uptake the tacit consent. She can do this for, at 
least, two very distinct reasons16. She can consider that he is not trustworthy enough, 
in the sense that, though he now desires not to interfere with her, she believes that he 
will indeed change his mind on this issue. Differently, despite the fact that Alice be-
                                                           
16 We thank Maria Miceli for clarifying the relevance of this distinction.  
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lieves in Bob’s trustworthiness, she simply does not want to take his car anymore: it 
is Alice who has changed her mind. Both state of affairs are however incompatible 
with the shared assumption of non-hostility. Let’s consider the latter first. If eventu-
ally Alice does not desire to take his car anymore, then, since he has decided not to 
interfere with her, Bob will in incur into losses (i.e. the opportunity costs Bob has al-
ready paid) given that he is relying on the fact that she has this desire. In fact, just as 
Bob’s silence, her silence too is a continuing confirmation of a belief of his: the ex-
pectation that she still desires something from him. Thus, she has also actively al-
lowed him to rely on something and, as a consequence, he has now acquired a right to 
the truth of this proposition, for the same reasons discussed above. If it is now too late 
for a warning, either she ought to compensate for the losses or she ought to fulfil his 
expectation, that is, Alice has to keep her desire in agreement with Bob’s. Thus, her 
silence, like his, has in this context a natural or salient meaning: it means a confirma-
tion that Alice still desires what Bob expects her to desire. On the other hand, given 
that both agents are presupposed to value non-hostility, Alice possible distrust in Bob 
is incompatible with his actual being non-hostile because by believing that he will 
change his mind, she would also believe that he will be hostile with her. And this is 
something that is ruled out by our shared assumption, or at least, it is something that 
is to be considered as false in order not to violate it. As a consequence, if Alice’s si-
lence naturally means that she still desires what he expects her to desire, and having 
common knowledge of the tacit consent, then Alice’s silence means also, or better 
implicates, that she relies on his consent. This is what is implicated in order not to 
violate the shared assumption of non-hostility. Because this fact follows from some-
thing we already commonly know and assumed, it is again something that we com-
monly know.  
Let’s take stock. Though agreements are very often based on communication, there 
is a kind of agreement that is not based on any form of communication, not even im-
plicit. It is for this kind that we reserve the name of tacit agreement. Crucial for the 
establishment of tacit agreements is the fact that there is a salient interpretation for 
one’s silence when it is common knowledge that an agent reasonably expects and 
wants something from another one or has a right to obtain. It is due to the salience of 
silence as a confirmatory device that we tacitly, and often involuntarily, become 
obliged to be reliable. To account for such normativity the prima facie plausibility of 
a principle of Reliability has been invoked. Under a presupposition that the agents 
share a value de se of not being moved by hostile attitudes, there is also an assump-
tion that the principle of Reliability is actually followed. As a consequence a tacit 
confirmation also means one’s tacit consent, or better, it ‘implicates’ such consent. 
Though implicated, such consent is not however coerced because it is also implicated 
that things could have been different, and this counterfactual possibility is matter of 
common knowledge. Finally, once an agent has another’s consent, it is again the sali-
ence of silence that guarantees that the last condition for an agreement is satisfied, 
that is, those who have the tacit consent tacitly confirm that they keep their desires in 
agreement and, on this basis, implicate their uptake. Tacit agreements are agreements 
without communication, and are established necessarily by the tacit confirmation of 
the involved parties. Tacit agreements are potential agreements in the sense that there 
are reasons to believe that all the conditions for an agreement are fulfilled and this 
fact is accessible to the parties, at least if they bothered to think hard enough. Tacit 
23
agreements remain potential as long as everything goes smoothly, that is, for exam-
ple, if the agent who is in fact tacitly consenting, also acts as expected for whatever 
reason. They become actualized and operative agreements when one, willing to act 
against what the tacit agreement mandates, cannot but acknowledge that the consent, 
the uptakes and all the other conditions do in fact hold, that is, cannot but assent that a 
real agreement is in place.  Finally tacit agreements, as all agreements, create recipro-
cal obligations and rights in the parties entering into them to keep their desires in 
agreement, that is, after an agreement is in place no unilateral change of mind is le-
gitimate anymore. 
9   Conventions are tacit unconditional agreements 
If, following Hume’s suggestion, conventions are agreements, and given that conven-
tions persist without the need of communication, they are agreements without com-
munication, that is, tacit agreements.  
Consider a convention to drive on the right sustained by an interest in avoiding colli-
sions.  
As we have proposed in Section 3, conventions are regularities of reciprocal trust, 
hence, in the example, agents in the population regularly rely on the others to drive on 
the right: everyone assumes that the other will drive on the right and acts accordingly, 
that is, he himself drives on the right. Given that a convention presupposes an agree-
ment in desire for some ends (our agreement in desiring not to collide), the expecta-
tion of reciprocal reliance is a reason for everyone to rely on each other so that, in this 
way, also our desire for the means (each desire to drive on the right in order to avoid 
collisions) are in agreement too. 
Trust, as we have suggested in Section 3, is a fundamental non-hostile attitude on the 
part of the trustor: an agent relies on another to do an action that stems from his 
motivation, without any coercion. The reason why each relies on the others when they 
are parties of a convention is that each one expects the others to rely on oneself in the 
same, non-hostile, way. Moreover in order to trust everyone has to assume such non-
hostile attitudes in the trustees. Suppose, then, as we have done in Section 6 that the 
agents in the population share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes, 
something that, of course, would promote the disposition to trust each other. Suppose 
also, as we have done in Section 7, that the agents have a bias for confirmation.    
Under these two assumptions, and given that a convention exists in a population, each 
time two or more agents interact with each other in a situation that is governed by the 
convention, if they keep silent about the expectation of reciprocal reliance that they 
mutually know to have, each of them confirms their reasonable expectations about 
each other, even if their mutual expectations of reciprocal reliance are not grounded 
in direct experience; the agents might have never met before. By being confirmatory, 
each actively allows reliance on the truth of such expectation of reciprocal reliance. 
As a consequence, each also acquires both a right that the other rely on oneself, and 
an obligation towards the other to rely on the other one.  Each agent has now a right 
that the other drives on the right (i.e. has a right to be trusted) and an obligation to 
drive on the right himself (i.e. ought to trust the other one).  
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  Moreover, for the same reasons discussed in Section 8, on the basis of a presupposi-
tion of reciprocal non-hostility, each silence also “implicates” each consent, that is, 
that each intends not to interfere with the desire fulfilment of the other one.  Given 
that in a convention, all the agents desire conformity of all the others, the tacit consent 
is the decision not to interfere with this desire of one’s own conformity. And since 
conformity of others to a convention amounts to that fact that the others do rely on 
oneself, in the example, one’s silence implicates one’s tacit consent to all the others 
that one has decided not to interfere with their desires to rely on them. In a conven-
tion, each also tacitly consents to trust the others.  
Moreover, in any convention it is the individual interest of each agent to conform, that 
is, everyone trusts the others because it is in the interest of everyone not to collide 
with the others, and so to rely on the others by driving on the right. Everyone’s desire 
for the means stems from everyone’s motivation not to collide. This very basic capac-
ity (or power) of instrumental rationality is something that everyone values and eve-
ryone acknowledges to the others. If one had known that was not in the interest of the 
others to drive on the right, that is, to rely on oneself, one would have acted accord-
ingly. This much is granted both by the fact that the agents are in a coordination prob-
lem [15], and in order to preserve our presupposition of non-hostility.  
Finally, each uptakes such tacit consent of the other by tacitly confirming, firstly, that 
others’ trust on oneself is still something one desires, and, secondly, by implicating 
that one does rely on such trust on oneself of the others and will act accordingly. That 
the uptake holds is required again by the presupposition of non-hostility, and has the 
consequence that each does not only trust the others, but also rely on the trust of the 
others on oneself.  
Each time the agents, ignorant of each other’s identities as they may be, do meet and 
keep silent about each other mutual expectations of reciprocal reliance establish or 
implicate a tacit agreement to trust each other. Since the tacit agreement is implicated 
by one’s own silence both as a trustor and as a trustee the agreement is reciprocal: 
there is a tacit agreement between the interacting agents the both trust and are trusted 
by the other one. The tacit agreement is unconditional because the tacit consent are 
not conditioned one on the other; differently they are implicated by the presupposition 
that the agents are non-hostile, or, in the specific context, that the principle of Reli-
ability is followed. Finally, the normativity of conventions is that of the tacit or impli-
cated agreement: by tacit agreeing to trust each other everyone is obliged to keep 
one’s desires for the means in agreement with the other and has a right that the oth-
ers do the same.  
10   Why conventions are tacit agreements 
A regularity is a convention for the way it persists, not for its origins. In convention, 
one conforms if the others conform because it is in one’s interest to conform. Since 
the stability of conventions is guaranteed by this specific motivational structure (i.e. 
their pre-existing agreement in desiring some end) together with common knowledge 
of all the conditions specified in Section 2, individual instrumental rationality alone 
suffices to stabilize it. Then, why should a convention be also a tacit agreement? Isn’t 
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is only just an additional pressure that is made redundant by the reasons the agents al-
ready have for acting as they do? What is the role of obligations and rights in conven-
tions?  
Though it is true that conventions are stable for these reasons, the fundamental 
condition that ensures stability is that the agents agree in desiring jointly co-realizable 
ends. But what is there to guarantee that they will keep doing so?  After all a common 
interest needs not be some ultimate end that we will invariably pursue forever. The 
ends we agree in desiring are often just means for some further ends we have. All in-
strumental desires cease to be motivationally effective, once the end in light of which 
we pursue the means has been either fulfilled or abandoned.  Suppose Alice and Bob 
have a common desire to meet each other one day during the week and they fulfil 
their desires following the convention to go at the movie together every Wednesday. 
Suppose also that Bob is secretly in love with Alice, and hopes that by recurrently 
meeting him she will fall in love too. Differently, for Alice, Bob is just a friend that 
she is keen to meet, and nothing more. This Wednesday, at the end, Bob realizes how 
desperate his situation is, how impossible it is that his love will be ever reciprocated, 
and he abandons his plan to seduce Alice altogether. If he suddenly revised his recur-
rent end to meet with Alice, there would no motive at all to still pursue the means of 
going to the movie with Alice that night. Still however, by not showing up, Bob 
would do something wrong and against Alice, something that, notwithstanding his 
feelings, he may wish to desire not to be moved to do.  
In other words, since all the parties to a convention conform (trust) on the assump-
tion of the trust of others, agents need protection and assurance against the mutability 
of interest that might compromise each individual project. Since the kind of common 
interest presupposed by a convention may be as volatile as any other end we pursue, 
everyone would be at risk if everyone were free to change one’s mind without taking 
into account the other in any way. Obligations act as further assurance in case one 
was to change his desires by entitling possible influencing actions (e.g. punishment 
by reproach), which can motivate the others beside their current desires.  
Conventions tend to reproduce agreement in desiring arbitrary means from agree-
ment in desires for the ends. However, by also being sources of tacit agreements be-
tween the agents, the arbitrary means are turned into ends to be pursued unless one is 
able to warn the other in time or is prepared to compensate for possible losses.  
11   Conclusion 
In his paper on causation, Lewis noted that Hume has defined a causal succession 
“twice over” [16]17. The aim of this article is to suggest that something similar has oc-
curred when Hume defined a convention as: “a general sense of common interest, 
which sense all the members of society express to one another, and which induces 
them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. […] When this common sense of in-
terest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution 
                                                           
17 Hume defines a causal succession both as a succession that institutes a regularity and by way 
of a counterfactual analysis. The two notions are to be kept separated, see Lewis (1973). 
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and behaviour. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement 
betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of 
us have a reference to those of the other, and are performed upon the supposition, that 
something is to be performed on the other part” (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
III.ii.2, emphasis added). 
That convention can be seen as tacit agreements is often suggested, and is consid-
ered as tantamount to the analysis offered by Lewis. However, what Lewis has shown 
is that, in certain conditions, an agreement in desires for the means might stem from 
our independent agreement in desires for the ends. However an agreement in desires 
is not the same as an agreement between the agents in that the latter, but not the for-
mer, is a social relationship between the agents. The fact the there is an agreement be-
tween the agents entails that their relationship is also a normative relationship. 
Whereas their mere agreement in desires may not have such consequences.  
In this paper we have shown that the normativity of conventions is the normativity 
of tacit agreements, that is, that the agent becomes bound to keep their desires for the 
means in agreement, and by becoming so bound they are assures the other will not 
change their minds without some concern for their fellows.  
The agreements that stem from conventions are tacit in the sense that they are im-
plicated by what the agents do (or forbear to do) though without any communication 
between them is necessary. In order for this be possible we have offered two substan-
tial hypotheses: (1) that there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of every-
one’s silence as confirmatory of the others’ expectations, and (2) that the agents share 
a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes, ad, on this basis that their interac-
tion are regulated by a presupposition that the principle of Reliability is followed. If 
the former hypothesis is compatible with many available empirical data about human 
decision-making (Section 7), the latter is matter of future research. 
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